Right around the time the defendants’ answer was due in district court, the procedural games began. On January 9, Frank emailed me for the first time stating that Anna was looking for new counsel — without explaining why. He claimed she had been searching since December 16, but I didn’t take it seriously. If she had genuinely been searching that long and hadn’t secured new representation yet, it seemed highly unlikely that any attorney would step into a case only 45 days before trial — especially when she had no real defense.
Then, two days before their answer deadline, Frank casually emailed me asking for an extension of time to file their response. I refused because there was no valid reason for it. This case had been pending since July 22, 2024. It didn’t matter that I had amended my complaint because nothing had fundamentally changed — the breach of contract and unfair and deceptive trade practice claims were the same. The only addition was the defamation claim, which they had known about since November 1, 2024 and he was directly evolved when it happened in August. They had plenty of time to prepare.
After I declined, Frank stated he didn’t have to notify me to begin with, which is not entirely true. Frank’s motion for extension of time violated multiple procedural rules. Under Rule 6(b), any extension not agreed upon by both parties requires good cause to be shown, and Frank’s motion failed to demonstrate valid cause for the delay. His filing also improperly sought ex parte relief without meeting the requirements of Local Rule 3.6(f), which mandates that any motion requesting an order without notice must disclose the legal basis for doing so — something he failed to include.
His “legal” basis was improper and misleading:
7. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint was improperly filed under N.C. Gen Stat. § 7A-229 and Rule 15 of the N.C. Rules of Civil Procedure.
(Defendants’ Motion for Extension of Time, Jan. 13, 2025)
8. Even if Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is deemed to be operative, Defendants’ response is not due until January 15, 2025, and thus the time allowed to respond has not expired.
9. Defendants’ counsel needs additional time to investigate and properly reply to the allegations and defects in the Amended Complaint; further, Defendants are in the process of securing new counsel in this matter, and need additional time in which to secure said counsel.
I explain why in my objection:
a. Defendants’ claim that Plaintiffs amended complaint was “improperly filed” is without merit. The original filings were under small claims court procedures, which do not apply here. Upon appeal to district court and following the arbitration process, Plaintiff properly filed the amended complaint under Rule 15(a) of the N.C. Rules of Civil Procedure, as no responsive pleading had been served.
(Plaintiff’s Objection to Extension of Time, Jan. 13, 2025)
b. Rule 15(a) allows a party to amend their pleading once as a matter of course before a responsive pleading is served. This is a clear procedural right exercised appropriately in this case.
c. Defendants’ reference to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-229 is irrelevant to the validity of the amended complaint. The statute governs procedural aspects of arbitration appeals and does not prohibit or restrict amendments to pleadings.
3. Defendants’ Motion Lacks Good Cause:
a. Under Rule 6(b) of the N.C. Rules of Civil Procedure, the burden of showing good cause rests with the Defendants. Their motion fails to demonstrate good cause for the following reasons:
i. Timing of New Counsel Claim: Defendants’ counsel claims that his client has been attempting to secure new representation since December 16, 2024, yet this was only communicated to Plaintiff on January 9, 2025, six days before the response deadline.
If securing new counsel was a genuine concern, it should have been raised immediately after the amended complaint was filed.
ii. Attorney Representation Was Previously Established: Defendants’ current attorney was assigned to this case upon appeal to district court on September 3, 2024 and actively represented Defendants during arbitration. Changing representation at this late stage, without good cause, appears to be a tactic to delay proceedings.
Rule 16 of the General Rules of Practice requires an attorney to show (1) justifiable cause, (2) reasonable notice to the client, and (3) permission of the court to withdraw from a case. Defendants have not established justifiable cause for a change in representation, and their attorney has continued to act on their behalf throughout the proceedings.
4. Prejudice to the Plaintiff:
a. Granting this extension would severely compress the timeline leading up to trial, currently scheduled for February 24, 2025, leaving Plaintiff inadequate time to prepare.
b. Defendants have had ample time to prepare since the filing of the initial complaint in July 2024, and their current motion demonstrates a lack of diligence rather than a legitimate need for more time.
5. Motion Reflects an Attempt to Delay Proceedings:
a. The Defendants’ counsel has failed to provide evidence of efforts to secure new representation despite Plaintiff’s request. Without such proof, the claim appears to be a strategic delay rather than a genuine obstacle to filing a response.
b. The core claims in this matter have remained consistent since the initial complaint, and Defendants have actively participated in the process, including small claims court and arbitration proceedings. While Plaintiff added a defamation claim to the amended complaint filed on December 16, 2024, opposing counsel was notified of this addition in the first week of November 2024, shortly after the evidence of defamation was discovered.
Furthermore, Defendants were aware of the alleged defamation, which occurred in
August 2024, as opposing counsel refused to retract the false and harmful statements at that time. Their knowledge of this issue for several months, coupled with their failure to address it earlier, undermines their claim that additional time is now needed to investigate or respond.
Also, the motion was filed without the required WAKE-CVD-05 Cover Sheet under Local Rule 12.2, which is mandatory for all motions accompanied by a proposed order. Without the cover sheet, the court was misled into treating the motion as routine or uncontested when, in fact, it was contested. These procedural violations not only prejudiced my ability to prepare for trial but also reflect a deliberate attempt to bypass proper judicial scrutiny.
They were asking for an extra 30 days, meaning I wouldn’t get their answer until just ten days before trial. That would have severely prejudiced my ability to prepare. Even setting aside the short timeframe, the motion they filed didn’t demonstrate “good cause” as required under Rule 6(b).
But even if it hadn’t been defective, Local Rule 4.2 makes it clear that aged cases must move forward unless a strong showing of good cause is made — especially after trial de novo is scheduled. They already had 90 days from arbitration to file a proper response. And technically, they should have filed an answer before arbitration even began. If they had done what they were supposed to, I wouldn’t have even had the opportunity to amend my complaint later.
Their motion wasn’t about fairness — it was about delay, manipulation, and trying to stack the deck against me by leaving me scrambling right before trial and the court allowed it.
NC GS § 7A‑229. Trial de novo on appeal.
Upon appeal noted, the clerk of superior court places the action upon the civil issue docket of the district court division. The district judge before whom the action is tried may order repleading or further pleading by some or all of the parties; may try the action on stipulation as to the issue; or may try it on the pleadings as filed. (1965, c. 310, s. 1.)
G.S. 1A-1, Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings.
(a) Amendments. – A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he may so
amend it at any time within 30 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading within 30 days after service of the amended pleading, unless the court otherwise orders.
G.S. 1A-1, Rule 6(b). Enlargement.
When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order. Upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period, the judge may permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this rule, the parties may enter into binding stipulations without approval of the court enlarging the time, not to exceed in the aggregate 30 days, within which an act is required or allowed to be done under these rules, provided, however, that neither the court nor the parties may extend the time for taking any action under Rules 50(b), 52, 59(b), (d), (e), 60(b), except to the extent and under the conditions stated in them.
N.C. Gen. R. Prac. 16 Withdrawal of Appearance.
No attorney who has entered an appearance in any civil action shall withdraw his appearance, or have it stricken from the record, except on order of the court. Once a client has employed an attorney who has entered a formal appearance, the attorney may not withdraw or abandon the case without (1) justifiable cause, (2) reasonable notice to the client, and (3) the permission of the court. (See Smith vs. Bryant, 264 N.C. 208. See also Rule 43 of Rules of the N.C. State Bar, Volume 4A of General Statutes of North Carolina, page 278, entitled “Withdrawal from employment as attorney or counsel.”)
Wake Cty. Local Civ. R. 12.2 Consent Orders/Judgments
Consent orders or consent judgments shall be delivered to the Clerk of Court, accompanied by WAKE-CVD-05. The courtroom clerk will present the proposed consent order/judgment to the presiding Judge for consideration. Submission of a proposed consent order or judgment directly to a judge for ruling or approval may result in a delay in the entry of the order/judgment. The presiding Judge will not consider approving any proposed consent order relating to a motion unless the motion has been filed prior to the tendering of the proposed order to the presiding Judge.