After I was told by the court to appear at a Webex hearing on February 14 following the previous day’s proceeding, I emailed the trial court administrator to confirm the hearing and explain that I had filed both an Objection to the Improperly Noticed Hearing and a Writ of Supersedeas and Motion to Stay with the Court of Appeals, citing the automatic stay under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-294. I also explained that due to the short notice and a work conflict, I could not attend. Judge Davidian responded—through the administrator—not with a neutral procedural clarification but with an inappropriate and condescending email, accusing me of a “scorched earth policy,” suggesting I “don’t understand how things work,” and recommending I seek counsel—despite judicial rules prohibiting judges from giving legal advice or making dismissive comments toward self-represented litigants.
During the February 14 hearing, which proceeded in my absence, the judge repeated many of those comments on the record and doubled down on dismissing my automatic stay argument. He improperly claimed the stay did not apply because he determined the orders I appealed were not substantial, despite the fact that the trial court has no authority to override or interpret the application of an automatic stay once an appeal has been filed. He incorrectly cited Rule 8 of the Appellate Rules, which governs motions to stay but does not override statutory automatic stays like the one under § 1-294. His comments included mocking the value of the case, stating “this is a $5,000 complaint, not the Brinks robbery,” and claiming my motion for exceptional case status and other pending orders were “not a big deal,” thereby minimizing both the record and my appeal rights.
He also misrepresented procedural facts, falsely stating that only the defendant’s motion to strike was properly noticed, when my motions had also been filed and sent, and he allowed argument on only what he deemed relevant. He failed to acknowledge my pending motions to strike the extension and to deem admissions admitted, and unilaterally removed the trial date without any proper hearing or reset plan. He concluded by setting a new answer deadline of March 14, 2025—improper tolling deadlines for the defense in violation of the stay.
It’s important to note that the defendants’ answer was actually due that same day, since they had already received an extension of time. Judge Davidian should not have allowed any further extension, as the motion to strike was meritless and even had a defective caption. Worse, during the prior day’s hearing, the defendants admitted they only filed the motion to strike because the extension of time motion was still pending—openly admitting to procedural gamesmanship. As if that wasn’t enough, the judge gave them 28 more days to file their answer, even though Rule 12 only allows 20 days. This effectively gave the defendants nearly 90 days to answer a complaint in a case that had already been moving forward for five months before I filed my amended complaint.
In short, the hearing was procedurally improper, jurisdictionally unauthorized, and rife with judicial bias, legal inaccuracies, and statements that violated the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct, especially Canons 1, 2(A), and 3(A)(4) regarding fairness, impartiality, and the right to be heard.
However instead of filing a written order so I could have excess to it right away, the docket stated:
VERDICT: MANDATORY STAY HAS BEEN DENIED, JUDGE DAVIDIAN WILL DRAFT ORDER, DENIED DEF MOTION TO STRIKE 12/16/24, COMPLAINT OF 12/16/24 WILL REMIAN, DEF HAS 3/14/25 TO FILE ANSWER. JURY TRIAL WILL BE REMOVED FROM CALENDAR AND REST BY TCA. JUDGE WILL DRAFT ORDER
On February 17, Judge Davidian filed the written order—and it was a complete mess. The order was riddled with procedural errors and clear indicators of bias, including: falsely implying that the defendants had received prior extensions when they hadn’t; ignoring the mandatory automatic stay under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-294; selectively ruling on the defendants’ motions while completely ignoring mine, even though they were properly filed; mischaracterizing the case as a summary ejectment instead of what it actually is—a habitability and UDTPA claim; and improperly extending the defendants’ deadline to respond by 28 days, exceeding the 20-day limit under Rule 12. The order also tried to retroactively justify the removal of the trial date, even though the trial had already been removed before the order was issued. To make matters worse, the judge selectively included only his own email in the record while excluding my formal response, which directly addressed and documented his biased conduct.
Violation: Jurisdictional overreach — the trial court improperly attempted to determine whether substantial rights were implicated (which is the role of the appellate court), and issued selective rulings that clearly favored defendants.
Result: The trial was cancelled, rescheduled for May 19, 2025, and then cancelled again.
I filed a supplemental notice of appeal on this order on Feb. 19.
*Note: I used automated transcription and still have the full audio recording for this hearing / ruling as well.
N.C. R. App. P. Rule 8. Stay Pending Appeal.
(a) Stay in Civil Cases. When appeal is taken in a civil action from a judgment, order, or other determination of a trial court, stay of execution or enforcement thereof pending disposition of the appeal must ordinarily first be sought by the deposit of security with the clerk of the superior court in those cases for which provision is made by law for the entry of stays upon deposit of adequate security, or by application to the trial court for a stay order in all other cases. After a stay order or entry has been denied or vacated by a trial court, an appellant may apply to the appropriate appellate court for a temporary stay and a writ of supersedeas in accordance with Rule 23. In any appeal which is allowed by law to be taken from an administrative tribunal to the appellate division, application for the temporary stay and writ of supersedeas may be made to the appellate court in the first instance. Application for the temporary stay and writ of supersedeas may similarly be made to the appellate court in the first instance when extraordinary circumstances make it impracticable to obtain a stay by deposit of security or by application to the trial court for a stay order.
NC GS § 1‑294. Scope of stay; security limited for fiduciaries.
When an appeal is perfected as provided by this Article it stays all further proceedings in the court below upon the judgment appealed from, or upon the matter embraced therein, unless otherwise provided by the Rules of Appellate Procedure; but the court below may proceed upon any other matter included in the action and not affected by the judgment appealed from. The court below may, in its discretion, dispense with or limit the security required, when the appellant is an executor, administrator, trustee, or other person acting in a fiduciary capacity. It may also limit such security to an amount not more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000), where it would otherwise exceed that sum.
Sharpe v. Worland, 351 N.C. 159, 161-62, 522 S.E.2d 577, 579 (1999).
“[I]mmediate appeal of interlocutory orders and judgments is available in at least two instances. First, immediate review is available when the trial court enters a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties and certifies there is no just reason for delay. . . . Second, immediate appeal is available from an interlocutory order or judgment which affects a substantial right.”
G.S. 1A-1, Rule 12. Defenses and objections; when and how presented; by pleading or motion; motion for judgment on pleading.
(a) (1) When Presented. – A defendant shall serve his answer within 30 days after service of the summons and complaint upon him. A party served with a pleading stating a crossclaim against him shall serve an answer thereto within 30 days after service upon him. The plaintiff shall serve his reply to a counterclaim in the answer within 30 days after service of the answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within 30 days after service of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. Service of a motion permitted under this rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed by order of the court:
a. The responsive pleading shall be served within 20 days after notice of the court’s action in ruling on the motion or postponing its disposition until the trial on the merits;
(f) Motion to strike. – Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a party within 30 days after the service of the pleading upon him or upon the judge’s own initiative at any time, the judge may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, irrelevant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.
North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct
A judge should uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary.
A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing, and should personally observe, appropriate standards of conduct to ensure that the integrity and independence of the judiciary shall be preserved.
Canon 2: A judge should avoid impropriety in all the judge’s activities.
A. A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct himself/herself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
Canon 3(A)(1):
A judge should be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it.
Canon 3(A)(4):
A judge should accord to every person who is legally interested in a proceeding, or the person’s lawyer, full right to be heard according to law.
Canon 3(A)(5):
A judge should dispose promptly of the business of the court.
Canon 3(B)(1):
A judge should diligently discharge the judge’s administrative responsibilities, maintain professional competence in judicial administration, and facilitate the performance of the administrative responsibilities of other judges and court officials.