DOJ filed their formal Response in Opposition to my Motion to Disqualify on April 1, 2025. That filing deliberately misrepresented both my position and the legal conflict I raised. The DOJ claimed Rule 1.7 didn’t apply because I wasn’t their client, completely ignoring that my argument was about an institutional conflict of interest—namely, that they were defending the very agency that had violated civil rights they are tasked with protecting. They tried to reframe my concerns as confusion over who represents whom, instead of acknowledging the ethical problem of a civil rights enforcement agency defending another agency accused of failing to enforce civil rights.
in an attempt to prejudice me against the tribunal, they submitted an affidavit relating to the complaint I had filed with the DOJ and Attorney General’s Office back in July, which I had referenced in my motion to disqualify. This affidavit was especially problematic because it came from the manager I had tried to contact multiple times, who refused to return my calls and had no direct interaction with me or involvement in my complaint. He submitted only one cherry-picked email—ignoring the multiple messages I had sent showing their failure to investigate. This affidavit was pure hearsay, presented without personal knowledge, and used to paint an incomplete and misleading picture, in clear violation of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, Rule 802 and 602. Its inclusion not only lacked legal foundation, but served as an improper attempt to bias the tribunal and dismiss the very basis of my disqualification motion.
On April 2, 2025, the Administrative Law Judge issued an order denying my motions to disqualify the DOJ and to strike the affidavit of Clint Minatee. The ruling completely misrepresented the basis of my motion, falsely reframing it as a personal issue about whether the DOJ could assist me individually—instead of addressing the clear institutional conflict of interest under Rule 1.7(a)(2) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The order also failed to enforce the court’s own directive that required the DOJ to submit a memorandum of law, which they never did, and failed to acknowledge that their response omitted key rebuttal evidence. What’s worse is that this ruling was issued on the same day the Tribunal also issued a Notice of Hearing on the Motion to Dismiss—despite having previously stated that all motions would be resolved without oral argument unless a hearing was requested, which neither party did.
I responded the next day by filing a Motion for Reconsideration and Objection to Further Hearing, pointing out that the court had violated its own prior procedural orders, mischaracterized my argument, admitted improper evidence, and failed to provide the required 15-day notice under G.S. § 150B-23(b). The hearing was only scheduled with 14 days’ notice, making it procedurally defective.* These compounding errors directly prejudiced my rights, denied me equal treatment, and violated Article I, Section 18 of the North Carolina Constitution, which guarantees that justice must be administered without favor, denial, or delay. I requested the order be reversed, the DOJ disqualified, and the case proceed on the written record only, as originally ordered.
To be completely transparent, I misinterpreted the rule—the 15-day notice requirement only applies to trial hearings, not motion hearings. However, you’ll see in her response that she ultimately cancelled the hearing because it was still procedurally improper.
G.S. 8C-1. Rule 602. Lack of personal knowledge.
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but need not, consist of the testimony of the witness himself. This rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 703, relating to opinion testimony by expert witnesses. (1983, c. 701, s. 1.)
G.S. 8C-1. Rule 802. Hearsay rule.
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by statute or by these rules.
North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.7 Conflict of Interest: Current Clients,
(2) the representation of one or more clients may be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client, or a third person, or by a personal interest of the lawyer.