This email chain shows Anna misrepresenting facts to outside agencies during a housing verification, including falsely implying there were official complaints against me, mischaracterizing the legal proceedings, and exaggerating my lease status to damage my credibility.
Despite providing clear evidence — including a 60-day notice and refuting claims about lease violations — the investigator failed to address these inaccuracies.
There was so much gaslighting in Anna’s responses that I didn’t bother highlighting every instance. Her language alone reveals an intent to retaliate and control the narrative, while simultaneously portraying me as hostile without any factual basis.
42 USC §3617. Interference, coercion, or intimidation.
It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of this title.
Pierce v. Atlantic Group, Inc., 724 SE 2d 568 (2012)
“In North Carolina, the term defamation applies to the two distinct torts of libel and slander.” Boyce & Isley, PLLC v. Cooper, 153 N.C.App. 25, 29, 568 S.E.2d 893, 898 (2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 965, 124 S.Ct. 431, 157 L.Ed.2d 310 (2003). “In general, libel is written while slander is oral.” Phillips v. Winston–Salem/Forsyth County Bd. of Educ., 117 N.C.App. 274, 277, 450 S.E.2d 753, 756 (1994), disc. review denied, 340 N.C. 115, 456 S.E.2d 318 (1995). In this case, Plaintiff’s complaint alleges two written communications were defamatory.
“In order to recover for [libelous] defamation, a plaintiff must allege and prove that the defendant made false, defamatory statements of or concerning the plaintiff, which were published to a third person, causing injury to the plaintiff’s reputation.” Tyson v. L’Eggs Products, Inc., 84 N.C.App. 1, 10–11, 351 S.E.2d 834, 840 (1987). “[T]he words attributed to defendant [must] be alleged ‘substantially’ in haec verba, or with sufficient particularity to enable the court to determine whether the statement was defamatory.” Stutts v. Duke Power Co., 47 N.C.App. 76, 84, 266 S.E.2d 861, 866 (1980). North Carolina courts recognize three classes of libel:
(1) Publications which are obviously defamatory and which are termed libels per se; (2) publications which are susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which is defamatory and the other is not, and (3) publications which are not obviously defamatory, but which become so when considered in connection with innuendo, colloquium and explanatory circumstances. This type of libel is termed libel per quod.”